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NOTES & COMMENTS
MULTIPLE PARTY LITIGATION UNDER
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN OKLAHOMA-
LAUBACH V. MORGAN
In 1973, the Oklahoma State Legislature enacted legislation provid-
ing for a system of modified comparative negligence. I This system, as its
name implies, is based upon evaluation of the plaintiff's and defendant's
negligence in comparison to one another. As with any comparison, the
complexity of the operation compounds greatly with an increase in the
number of parties to the comparison. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in
its recent decision in Laubach v. Morgan,2 recognized the very general
nature of Oklahoma's comparative negligence legislation and its ambi-
guity in regard to actions involving multiple parties.3 The purpose of this
comment is to examine the effectiveness of the Oklahoma comparative
negligence system in actions involving multiple parties. The focus will
be on the two central objectives of comparative negligence: just compen-
sation for the negligent plaintiff, and equitable damage apportionment
among the defendants.4 The attainment of these objectives within the
Oklahoma system is influenced by three distinct factors. The compara-
tive negligence statute, the Oklahoma Supreme Court by its decision in
Laubach, and lingering common law doctrines have all interacted to
define the operation of comparative negligence in multi-party litigation.
In order to identify the present system, these sources will be con-
sidered separately to determine their individual impact on the two basic
comparative negligence objectives. Essential to this analysis is an under-
standing of the common law background in the multiple party negligence
action.
1. Act of April 18, 1973, ch. 30, §§ 1, 2, 1973 Okla. Sess. Laws 40 (codified at OKLA.
STAT. tit. 23, §§ 11, 12 (Supp. 1977)).
2. 49 OKLA. B.A.J. 60 (1978).
3. Id. at 61.
4. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 2.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SCHWARTZ].
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I. BACKGROUND OF MULTIPLE PARTY LITIGATION
Before the advent of comparative negligence, the multiple party
negligence action in Oklahoma was governed by three basic common law
doctrines. First, a plaintiff found contributorily negligent to any degree
was denied recovery pursuant to the doctrine of contributory negligence.5
Second, if the plaintiff was innocent of any negligence, the doctrine of
joint and several liability provided that each defendant was liable for the
entire judgment.6 Finally, a co-defendant forced to pay more than his
proportionate share of the damages was denied any cause of action for
contribution from his joint tortfeasors. 7
A. Contributory Negligence
In Butterfield v. Forrestor8 the defendant was found negligent in
having left a pole projecting across the road, but Lord Ellenborough
denied recovery to the plaintiff who had failed to use ordinary care in
avoiding the obstruction. 9 This decision evolved into a complete bar to
the negligent plaintiff's recovery known as the defense of contributory
negligence. The Butterfield decision, though often criticized for allow-
ing inequitable results, was given broad application in the United
States.1 American jurisdictions, determined not to provide aid to the
negligent plaintiff, reasoned that such faulty conduct was not to be
rewarded but deterred by the denial of a legal remedy for damages."1
Beginning in 1896, the courts of Oklahoma have held that a plaintiff
guilty of contributory negligence could not recover damages as a matter
5. Pittman v. City of El Reno, 4 Okla. 638, 46 P. 495 (1896). See also notes 12-19
infra and accompanying text.
6. Home Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 434 P.2d 250 (Okla. 1967); National Trailor
Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 434 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1967). See also text
accompanying notes 20-22 infra.
7. Rose v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R., 308 F. Supp. 1357 (W.D. Okla.
1970). See also text accompanying notes 23-34 infra.
8. 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
9. Lord Ellenborough stated: "A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction
which has been made by the fault of another, and avail himself of it, if he did not use
common and ordinary caution to be in the right." Id. at 927.
10. Some authors have claimed that the decision has been given a much broader scope
than was originally intended, and that Butterfield could easily be read in terms of "as-
sumption of the risk." See SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.2; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 416 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. For a more
thorough discussion of the historical development and spread of the contributory negli-
gence doctrine in the United States, see Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L.
REV. 465 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Comparative Negligence]; Comment, Contributory
Negligence, 21 HARv. L. REV. 233 (1908).
11. See PROSSER, supra note 10, § 65, at 418.
1977]
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of law. 12 Recognizing the inequity of the doctrine where the plaintiff was
only slightly negligent, exceptions were adopted to mitigate its often
harsh results. 13 For instance, the defense of contributory negligence was
generally not available to a defendant whose acts were considered "will-
ful" or "reckless," 14 or where violation of a statute resulted in harm that
the statute was intended to prevent.15 The major exception to the defense
was the well known doctrine of "last clear chance," which applied when
the defendant perceived the dangerous position of the plaintiff in time to
reasonably have avoided the injury.16 However, the most radical attempt
to modify the contributory negligence defense was found in Haily-ola
Coal v. Morgan.17 The trial court in that case had gone so far as to
judicially adopt "comparative negligence" by instructing the jury that
the plaintiff's negligence would not exonerate the defendant, but would
only serve to mitigate the damages.18 This attempted modification was
short-lived, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court promptly ruled such in-
struction in error and reaffirmed the contributory negligence defense as a
complete bar to recovery. 19
B. Joint and Several Liability
If the defendants were found to be negligent and failed in their
affirmative defense of contributory negligence, the doctrine of joint and
several liability was applied. This principle provided that in situations
involving a single indivisible injury,20 proximately caused by two or
12. Hopson v. Triplett, 380 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Rader v. Fleming, 429
P.2d 750 (Okla. 1967); Thorp v. St. Louis & S.F. R., 73 Okla. 123, 175 P. 240 (1918);
Pittman v. City of El Reno, 4 Okla. 638, 46 P. 495 (1896).
13. See generally PROSSER, supra note 10, § 65, at 418; Leflar, The Declining Defense
of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1946).
14. In Conner v. Burdine, 120 Okla. 20, 250 P. 109 (1926), the Oklahoma Supreme
Court embraced the rule that when the defendant's wrongdoing is willful, contributory
negligence is no defense. See PROSSER, supra note 10, at 426.
15. See generally Prosser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation of Statute,
32 MINN. L. REV. 105 (1948).
16. The doctrine originated in the English case of Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588
(Ex. 1842). Though the plaintiff was found to have been contributorily negligent in causing
the accident, the court allowed him to recover, stating that the defendant had the last
chance to avoid the accident and should have done so. Id. at 589. For a statement of the
rule in Oklahoma, see Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Taylor, 196 F. 878,880 (8th Cir. 1912).
Note that the doctrine of "last clear chance" allows the plaintiff total recovery, and, for
this reason, it has been criticized as a means of damage apportionment. See James, Last
Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938).
17. 39 Okla. 71, 134 P. 29 (1913).
18. Id. at 72, 134 P. at 30.
19. The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated: "The law will not weigh or apportion the
concurring negligence of a plaintiff and defendant. There can be no recovery by a plaintiff
who has been guilty of contributory negligence." Id.
20. See generally PROSSER, supra note 10, §§ 46-48.
[Vol. 13:266
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more tortfeasors, each defendant was liable for the entire damage
award.21 By holding each defendant jointly and severally liable, the risk
of an insolvent defendant was placed on the wrongdoers rather than on
the innocent plaintiff.22 Furthermore, a co-defendant forced to pay a
disproportionate share of the entire liability was left without recourse
against his co-defendants, as the third doctrine, denying the right to
contribution among joint tortfeasors, operated to deny him a legal right to
contribution from his co-defendants.2 3
C. Right of Contribution
The common law denial of a right to contribution originated in the
English case of Merryweather v. Nixan.24 The case involved an inten-
tional tort of conversion and resulted in a joint judgment against two
defendants. According to Dean Prosser, the basis of the decision denying
one co-defendant any right to contribution from the other rested on the
intentional nature of the tort. 25 Early American decisions appropriately
applied the rule in situations of willful or intentional conduct, but not in
cases of negligent acts. 26 As the doctrine spread, the original context and
purpose of the rule became obscured, and most jurisdictions came to
deny any right to contribution among joint tortfeasors in all tort actions,
including negligence.27
Oklahoma has followed the common law denial of contribution as it
evolved in the United States.28 The legislature has only provided for the
right of contribution in the context of breach of contract.29 Except for a
minor exception, 0 this contribution statute has repeatedly been held
21. Home Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 434 P.2d 250 (Okla. 1967); National Trailor
Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 434 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1967).
22. For a discussion of how the Oklahoma Supreme Court has shifted the risk of loss
under comparative negligence, see notes 84-91 infra and accompanying text.
23. National Trailor Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 434 P.2d 238 (Okla.
1967).
24. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). See Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly
Charged for Negligence- Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176 (1898).
25. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 50, at 306.
26. For a thorough discussion of the early application of the contribution rule, see
Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v.
Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176 (1898).
27. See PROSSER, supra note 10, § 50.
28. Rose v. Chicago Rock Island and Pac. R.R., 308 F. Supp. 1357 (W.D. Okla. 1970).
29. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 831 (Supp. 1977).
30. The so-called "lenient exception" to the general rule of no contribution among
joint tortfeasors, provides that one held constructively or vicariously liable for injuries
caused to a party, by the active negligence of another, has a right of indemnity against the
causal actor. Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cement Co., 215 F. 2d 368, 369
(10th Cir. 1954).
1977]
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inapplicable to joint tortfeasors.3' Professor Merrill has argued that the
statute has been too tightly construed because the 1910 amendment
adding the words "regardless of the nature of the demand upon which
judgment was rendered," evidenced the legislative intent to extend the
right of contribution beyond the contractual context.3 2 However, in 1967
the Oklahoma Supreme Court specifically held that the 1910 amendment
did not change the rule denying contribution among joint tortfeasors.33
Laubach reaffirms this position. 4
Consequently, the common law doctrines of contributory negli-
gence, joint and several liability and the denial of contribution among
tortfeasors provide the framework for the multiple party negligence
action. Contributory negligence, as a complete bar to recovery, is direct-
ly opposed to the concept of just compensation for a negligent plaintiff,
the first objective of comparative negligence. However, a plaintiff free
from contributory negligence was provided with a greater opportunity for
just compensation by the principle of joint and several liability. Since
degrees of negligence among the co-defendants were of no concern, the
second objective of equitable damage apportionment was also not
achieved. Further, the denial of a right to contribution actually prevented
damage apportionment where it might otherwise have occurred.
The Oklahoma comparative negligence statute and the Laubach
decision have drastically altered these common law doctrines.35 The
legislative and judicial impact upon the common law will now be as-
sessed to determine the present application of the system and the status of
the two comparative negligence objectives.
II. THE IMPACT OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
With the passage of a comparative negligence statute in 1973,36
Oklahoma joined the national trend in abolishing the common law de-
31. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 384 F.2d 386 (10th Cir.
1967); Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 Okla. 25, 267 P. 641 (1928); Fakes v. Price, 18
Okla. 413, 89 P. 1123 (1907).
32. Merrill, Oklahoma and the Uniform State Law Program, 1966, 38 OKLA. B.A.J.
643 (1967); Comment, Contribution: Between Joint Debtors Exclusive of Contract Express
or Implied, 8 OKLA. L. REV. 349 (1955). ,
33. In National Trailor Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 434 P.2d 238
(Okla. 1967), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held: "It is our conclusion that 12 O.S. 1961, §
831, did not change the rule denying contribution where one joint tortfeasor satisfied a
joint judgment for tort liability." Id. at 244.
34. 49 OKLA. B.A.J. at 61.
35. See notes 37, 38, & 84-87 infra and accompanying text.
36. See Act of April 18, 1973, ch. 30, §§ 1, 2, 1973 Okla. Sess. Laws 40 (codified at
OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 11, 12 (Supp. 1977)).
270 [Vol. 13:266
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fense of contributory negligence.37 A plaintiff is no longer completely
barred from recovering damages because of his own negligence. Instead,
recovery in negligence actions is based on a comparison of negligence.3 8
The state legislature had three basic alternatives to select from in adapt-
ing comparative negligence to Oklahoma tort law. Although all three
types abrogated common law contributory negligence, each represented
an explicit policy choice regarding the first objective of just compensa-
tion for the negligent plaintiff.
The Pure Form of Comparative Negligence
Under the pure form of comparative negligence, the plaintiff may
recover damages diminished by his own measure of fault-regardless of
whether his negligence is greater than or equal to the negligence of the
adverse party.39 Just compensation for the negligent plaintiff is con-
sidered to be whatever portion of damages which was not self-caused.
For example, assume the plaintiff has suffered $10,000 in damages, and
the jury finds the plaintiff to have been 60% negligent and the defendant
40% negligent. Following the pure system of comparative negligence,
the defendant is liable for his proportion of the entire liability according
to his percentage of negligence. Thus the plaintiff will recover $4,000
from the defendant.
The fact that only three state legislatures' have adopted the pure
form is evidence of the general legislative dissatisfaction with a system
37. In regard to tlke general spread of comparative negligence, see SCHWARTZ, supra
note 4, § 1.1; Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189
(1950).
38. The relevant statutes provide:
§ 11. Comparative negligence. Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery of
damages for any injury, property damage or death where the negligence of the
person injured or killed is of lesser degree than the negligence of any person,
firm, or corporation causing such damage.
In all actions hereafter accruing for negligence resulting in personal injuries
or wrongful death or injury to property, contributory negligence shall not prevent
a recovery where any negligence of the person so injured, damaged, or killed is of
lesser degree than any negligence of the person, firm, or corporation causing such
damage; provided that where such contributory negligence is shown on the part
of the person injured, damaged or killed, the amount of the recovery shall be
diminished in proportion to such contributory negligence.
§ 12. Defense of contributory negligence or assumption of risk as question of
fact. The defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all
cases whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall at all times be left to the jury,
unless a jury is waived by the parties.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, §§ 11, 12 (Supp. 1977) (effective August 16, 1973).
39. See C. HEFr & C. JAMES HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 1.50 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as HEFT]; Comparative Negligence, supra note 10, at 508; SCHWARTZ,
supra note 4, § 3.2.
40. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1976);
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1973).
1977]
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which allows the negligent plaintiff to recover damages for an injury
which he may be more responsible for than the defendant. 41 However, in
recent years Alaska, California and Florida have judicially adopted the
pure form.42
The Modified Form of Comparative Negligence
The modified form of comparative negligence represents a legisla-
tive effort to limit the ability of a negligent plaintiff to recover damages. 43
Just compensation for the plaintiff is limited in the sense that he must
qualify for recovery within the legislative design. This is accomplished in
either of two ways: either the plaintiff's negligence must not be greater
than the negligence of the defendant, or his negligence must be lesser
than the defendant's. The first method is referred to as the 50% modified
form of comparative negligence, and would allow a plaintiff equally
negligent with the defendant to recover one-half of his damages. The
second alternative is the 49% modified form, and it requires that the
plaintiff's negligence be less than the defendants. This formula results in
no damage award when both parties are found to be equally at fault. 44
The Slight-Gross Form of Comparative Negligence
In all negligence actions in Nebraska45 and South Dakota, 46 the
slight-gross form of modified comparative negligence is applied. These
jurisdictions provide that a plaintiff may recover damages if his negli-
gence is "slight" in comparison to that of the defendant. The difficulty
in attempting to define what constitutes "slight" negligence is apparent,
and both states appear to be moving away from strict adherence to this
term.47 The administrative difficulties inherent in such a system support
the conclusion that this form will not be expanded beyond its present
use.
48
41. For criticism of such a result, see Haugh, Comparative Negligence: A Reform
Long Overdue, 49 ORE. L. REV. 38, 46 (1969).
42. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804,
532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
43. See HEFT, supra note 39, § 1.40; SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 3.5.
44. The 49% modified form is the most widely accepted type of comparative negli-
gence. HEFT, supra note 39, § 1.4; SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 3.5.
45. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1975).
46. S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967).
47. "[T]he history of Nebraska and South Dakota cases show a trend away from
trying to define 'slight negligence' and more toward making a comparison of negligence
between the plaintiff and defendant. The result is very close to a defacto 50% system."
SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 3.4. For discussion of the development of the slight-gross
form, see Comparative Negligence, supra note 10, at 486.
48. The difficulties involved include: the computation of the award on the basis of the
[Vol. 13:266
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The Oklahoma Version
The Oklahoma lawmakers copied the Arkansas comparative negli-
gence statute4 9 and chose the 49% modified form of comparative negli-
gence.50 The statute is a concise statement abolishing contributory negli-
gence and establishing comparative negligence as the basis for just
compensation. Beyond this initial statement, the legislation is without
explicit guidelines for its operation and is considered a "general" type of
comparative negligence act. 1
At the time of its enactment, the comparative negligence statute was
criticized as having created considerable interpretative problems and
conflicts with existing Oklahoma tort doctrine.5 2 For instance, the statute
specifically provides that the claimant's negligence is to be compared to
the negligence of "the person, firm or corporation causing such dam-
age." 53 It was contended that because the legislature chose this phraseol-
ogy, the only negligence to be compared was that of the causal actors. 4
However, most other jurisdictions have interpreted such language as
negligence distribution, determination of the appropriate bases for allocating fault, proper
jury instructions, and the distinction of questions of law and fact. See SCHWARTZ, supra
note 4, § 3.4.
49. In adopting the Arkansas law, the only modification made by the Oklahoma
legislature was a grammatical correction, changing "less" to "lesser" in section 11. For
the full text of Oklahoma's statute see note 38 supra. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1730.1
to .2 (1962) (repealed 1969) (current version ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 27-1765)
(Supp. 1977). The 1973 Arkansas comparative negligence act extends the comparative
system beyond negligence suits and establishes a "fault" basis for liability apportionment.
See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
50. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
51. It has been argued that the absence of a comprehensive statute or specific
legislative guidance is the failing of most comparative negligence statutes. See Leflar,
Comments on Mak v. Freck, 21 VAND. L. REV. 918 (1968). Others contend that the
Oklahoma type of statute may prove beneficial by allowing judicial discretion in filling in
the details. See Keeton, Comparative Negligence-The Oklahoma Version, 10 TULSA L.J.
19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Keeton].
52. Several authors contended that the comparative negligence act was unconstitu-
tional in light of OKLA. CONST. art. 23, § 6, which provides for the defense of contributory
negligence. Compare Cooper & Olson, Constitutional Aspects of the Comparative Negli-
gence Statutes, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 49 (1975) (contending comparative negligence to be
unconstitutional) with Gibbens, Constitutionality of Oklahoma's Comparative Negligence
Statute, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 33 (1975) (arguing the constitutionality of the legislation). Other
conflicts and areas of concern were noted in the following: Keeton, supra note 51;
Woods, Comparative Negligence in Oklahoma-A New Experience, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 1
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Woods]; Comment, Torts: Oklahoma's Uncharted Land of
Comparative Negligence, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 122 (1974); Comment, Comparative Negli-
gence-Oklahoma Takes a Crippled Step Forward, 9 TULSA L.J. 239 (1973).
53. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 11 (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). See note 38 supra for the
complete text of the statute.
54. This issue has particular significance with respect to the negligent entrustment
action and imputed negligence. The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Laubach chose not to
deal with this issue. 49 OKLA. B.A.J. 60, 62 n.13 (1978). It has been argued that in such
8
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requiring apportionment of liability to be based on an examination of
proximate cause.55 Also, the Oklahoma statute is specifically limited to
negligence actions.5 6 Soon after the Arkansas law was copied in Oklaho-
ma, the Arkansas legislature rewrote their comparative negligence statute
in terms of "comparative fault." ' 57 Therefore the scope of the new
Arkansas statute is considerably broader as it encompasses such areas as
products liability and breach of warranty.
Beyond the interpretative problems inherent within the comparative
negligence statute, there are several areas for potential conflict between
traditional tort doctrine and the new Oklahoma law. These areas include
the judicial doctrines that preceded comparative negligence and attempt-
ed to mitigate the results of the harsh common law defense of contribu-
tory negligence.58 Various other areas of procedure and traditional tort
doctrine are beyond the scope of this comment, but they have posed
problems and required clarification in other modified comparative negli-
gence jurisdictions. These include: the rule of voluntary assumption of
risk;5 9 the effect of settlement;6° the award of punitive damages; 61 rele-
cases only the negligence of the causative actor should be compared to that of the
claimant. See Comment, Agency: Negligent Entrustment-May the Defendant Choose the
Plaintiff's Theory?, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 181 (1977); Comment, Torts: Imputed Comparative
Negligence, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 941 (1975).
55. For an excellent discussion of proximate cause as it relates to comparative
negligence, see SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, §§ 4.2-4.5.
56. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the limited application of the Oklahoma
statute in Kirland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). See McNichols,
The Kirkland v. General Motors Manufacturer's Products Liability Doctrine- What's In a
Name?, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 347 (1974).
57. The new Arkansas law specifically provides: "The word 'fault' as used in this Act
includes any act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty or breach of any
legal duty which is a proximate cause of any damages sustained by any party." ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 27-1763 (Supp. 1977).
58. Whether "willful" or "reckless" conduct and the doctrine of "last clear chance"
will survive comparative negligence remains to be determined. An interesting issue with
regard to the first exception is whether the Oklahoma courts will define "willful" as only
intentional conduct or whether it will include reckless conduct. According to Professor
Schwartz, if the former interpretation is adopted, the plaintiff's contributory negligence
will probably not be taken into account in determining the division of liability. The latter
interpretation may require a negligence comparison. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 5.3. See
also Woods, supra note 52, at 13. Concerning the "last clear chance" doctrine, it has
been argued that it is merely a step toward comparative negligence and should not co-exist
with such a system. See Comment, Torts: Comparative Negligence and the Doctrine of
Last Clear Chance-Are They Compatible?, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 444 (1975).
59. The rule of voluntary assumption of risk provides that if the plaintiff knowingly
and voluntarily assumed the risk of harm arising from the negligence of the defendant, the
defendant is relieved of any liability for his negligence. Davis v. Whitsett, 435 P.2d 592,
599 (Okla. 1967). The issue with respect to comparative negligence is whether the assump-
tion of risk should be included as a factor in the comparative negligence calculus, rather
than acting as a complete defense for the negligent defendant. The fact that the Oklahoma
comparative negligence legislation specifically states the defense of assumption of risk as
[Vol. 13:266
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vant jury instructions; 62 joinder of parties;63 and the appropriateness of
imputed negligence. 6
EE. IMPACT OF THE LAUBACH DECISION
Until January of 1978, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had not been
presented with a question on the application of the comparative negli-
gence statute in the context of multiple parties.65 Laubach v. Morgan
66
a question of fact for the jury, seems to indicate a legislative intent to maintain the
defense. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 12 (Supp. 1977). For the text of the statute see note 38
supra. For discussion of the unfairness of such a rule, see Comment, Torts: Comparative
Negligence+ Implied Assumption of Risk=Injustice, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 549 (1974).
60. The issue of settlement focuses on the negligence comparison and inclusion of all
parties relevant to the suit. Texas has attempted to solve the confusion over settlement by
legislating guidelines both for situations where a settling joint tortfeasor is joined in the
suit and where he is not. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a)(2)(d)-(e) (Vernon
1978).
61. Oklahoma has established a policy allowing a plaintiff to recover exemplary
damages for the sake of deterence and punishment. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1971). The
question is whether this policy is applicable in the context of comparative negligence.
Wisconsin has considered such damages to be incompatible with a system of comparative
negligence and has abolished punitive damages in negligence cases. Bielski v. Schulze, 16
Wis. 2d 1, -, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962). See generally Woods, The New Kansas
Comparative Negligence Act-An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9
(1975); Woods, supra note 52, at 16-30.
62. For an excellent discussion of the use of comparative negligence jury instructions
and interrogatories in Arkansas and their possible adaptation to Oklahoma, see Woods,
supra note 52, at 16-30.
63. To attain a valid comparison and equitable apportionment of liability, all relevant
parties should be joined in an action where comparative negligence is at issue. The
potential for variable damage apportionment by different juries should be sufficient
incentive to avoid multiple trials of the same suit. Though the Oklahoma comparative
negligence statute does not specifically empower the plaintiff or defendant to implead all
parties relevant to the controversy, the general civil procedure sections provide the
necessary joinder provisions. The comparative negligence system requires an informed
apportionment of liability among all relevant parties, and the Oklahoma courts must
encourage a liberal interpretation of the statutory joinder provisions to implement
comparative negligence. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 17.1.
64. The master-servant relationship, where the negligence of the servant is imputed to
the master, Oklahoma City v. Dobbs, 193 Okla. 183, 142 P.2d 369 (1943), and the joint
enterprise doctrine, Gilmore v. Grass, 68 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1933), are specific instances
where Oklahoma law has followed the policy of imputed contributory negligence. Accord-
ing to Dean Keeton: "The thought has been that in those situations where a person is
vicariously liable for the negligence of another he should in like manner be charged with
his negligence if an attempt is made to recover against another." Keeton, supra note 51, at
34. Keeton concludes that a proper construction of the comparative negligence statute will
be that imputed contributory negligence has been legislatively abolished. Id. But see
Comment, Torts: Imputed Comparative Negligence, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 941 (1975).
65. The courts had only ruled twice on comparative negligence: once in Hopson v.
Triplett, 380 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. Okla. 1974), where the Federal district court held that
comparative negligence did not apply to actions arising before the statute's effective date;
and then in Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court found the comparative negligence statute did not apply beyond the
negligence context.
66. 40 OKLA. B.A.J. 60 (1978).
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presented the first such opportunity, nearly five years after the advent of
comparative negligence in Oklahoma. This case arose out of an action for
damages resulting from a three car collision. At trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff and assessed damages of $4,000.00. The
jury also apportioned the negligence among the parties in the following
manner: Plaintiff Laubach 30%; Defendant Morgan 20%; Defendant
Martin 50%. The trial court entered judgment for Laubach and reduced
the $4,000.00 award to $2,800.00,67 this amount representing the portion
of damages caused by the defendants.
A. The Negligence Comparison
On appeal, defendant Morgan contended no liability should be
assessed against him because he had been found less negligent than the
plaintiff.6" As a result, the first issue that faced the court was whether the
negligence of the plaintiff was to be compared to each defendant individ-
ually or to the combined negligence of the defendants as a unit. The
resolution of this issue centered on the first objective of comparative
negligence, the provision of just compensation for the negligent plaintiff
injured by multiple defendants.
According to the statute, the negligent plaintiff may recover dam-
ages diminished in proportion to his contributory negligence-if such
negligence is of "lesser degree than any negligence of the person, firm or
corporation causing such damage.''69 In instances involving a single
plaintiff and single defendant, the statutory application is simple: the
claimant found less negligent than the defendant will recover damages
reduced by his percentage of the negligence. 70 When multiple parties are
involved, the language of the statute becomes ambiguous. In the
Laubach situation, a comparison between the plaintiff and defendants
individually would allow recovery only against Martin, whereas combin-
ing the negligence of the defendants and comparing it as a unit would
permit recovery against both Martin and Morgan.
The plaintiff's ability to attain just compensation is highly
complicated when a large number of defendants cause the injury. As-
sume for example, that the jury finds the plaintiff 25% at fault and
67. Id.
68. Id. at 61.
69. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 11 (Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
70. Though not expressly required by the Oklahoma statute, the trier of fact is
typically instructed to make three specific findings: (1) the percentage of causal negligence
attributable to the plaintiff; (2) the percentage of causal negligence attributable to the
defendant; (3) the amount of damage suffered by the plaintiff. See generally SCHWARTZ,
supra note 4, §§ 17.1, 17.4.
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apportions the remaining negligence among the co-defendants in the
following manner: D1-20%; D2-20%; D3-20% and D4-15%. An
individual comparison would find the plaintiff's negligence exceeding
that of each defendant and the plaintiff would be denied recovery.71
Conversely, a unit comparison would establish the plaintiff's negligence
as less than the combined negligence of the defendants and allow the
plaintiff to recover 75% of the damages. It is apparent that the plaintiff
would then be recovering from defendants whose individual negligence
was each less than that of the plaintiff.72
Other jurisdictions have reached varying interpretations in regard to
this question. The Arkansas Supreme Court, in the well reasoned opinion
of Walton v. Tull,73 chose to compare the negligence of the plaintiff to
the negligence of the defendants taken as a unit. The court considered
this interpretation to coincide with the common law rule which allows a
plaintiff free from contributory negligence to recover his entire damages
from any defendant found to have negligently caused the plaintiff's
injury. 74 The legislatures of Kansas75 and Texas76 have explicitly adopted
the Arkansas method of comparison within their respective comparative
negligence statutes.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reached the opposite interpretation in
dealing with nearly identical statutory language. The original Wisconsin
comparative negligence statute was enacted in 1931 and provided that
contributory negligence would not bar a plaintiff's recovery where "such
negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought. ",77 Though the original Wisconsin statute has been
modified, the singular "person against whom recovery is sought," was
retained in the 1971 revision. 8 Soon after the passage of the original act,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not recover
against any defendant whose negligence was equal to or less than the
71. See notes 43 & 44 supra and accompanying text.
72. Though the legislature has required that the plaintiff's negligence be of a "lesser"
degree than the defendants', the statutory ambiguity in the multiple party action may
permit recovery where a plaintiff is the most negligent party.
73. 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962).
74. Id. at-, 356 S.W.2d at 26. In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Harris argued that
such an interpretation allows a plaintiff to recover against a defendant equally or less
negligent than the plaintiff, and thus was not in accordance with the legislative intent. Id.
at -, 356 S.W.2d at 27.
75. KAN. CIV. PRO. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(a) (Vernon Supp. 1977).
76. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a(2)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1973).
77. Act of July 26, 1949, ch. 548, § 2, 1949 Wis. Laws (codified at Wis. STAT. §
331.045 (1949) (repealed in 1971)) (emphasis added).
78. Act of June 23, 1971, ch. 47, 1971 Wis. Legis. Serv. 80 (West) (codified at Wis.
STAT. § 895.045 (1971)).
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plaintiff's.7 9 This position committed the Wisconsin courts to an indi-
vidual comparison between the negligent parties in the multi-party suit
and has repeatedly been followed in accordance with the perceived
legislative policy.80
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Laubach considered both in-
terpretations of the statutory language and adopted the unit comparison
construction of the Arkansas Supreme Court.8" This approach was con-
sidered more appropriate to provide the plaintiff with just compensation
when multiple tortfeasors are involved.
B. Damage Apportionment
Anticipating that the supreme court might affirm the unit compari-
son made by the trial court, Morgan argued in the alternative that his
liability should be limited to 20% of the damage award.8 2 This brought
into issue the second objective of the comparative negligence statute,
equitable damage apportionment. The trial court had ruled, on the basis
of common law joint and several liability, that Laubach could collect his
entire award from either Morgan or Martin.8 3 In this situation, the
supreme court found the joint liability principle to be of "questionable
soundness," 8 4 and could not condone the inequity of forcing a defendant
to pay the entire damages when his negligence was less than the plain.
tiff's.8 5 Recognizing that the unfairness of the system was magnified by
the denial of contribution among joint tortfeasors, the court found it
necessary to make one of two possible decisions:
1. Allow "comparative contribution" among joint tortfeasors
in proportion to the party's negligence.
2. Do away with the "entire liability rule" and provide that
multiple tortfeasors are severally liable only, thus each
79. Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, -, 252 N.W. 721, 728
(1934).
80. "The general rule in this state is that the comparison of negligence in a multiple
defendant case is required to be between the plaintiff and the individual defendants."
Mariuzza v. Kenower, 68 Wis.2d 321, -, 228 N.W.2d 702, 704 (1975). The sole exception
to this rule was noted in Reber v. Hanson, 260 Wis. 632, 51 N.W.2d 505 (1952), where in
the case of negligent parents the court ruled: "Tlhe duty to protect was joint, the
opportunity to protect was equal, and as a matter of law neither the obligation nor the
breach of it was divisible." Id. at -, 51 N.W.2d at 508. Accord Soczka v. Rechner, 73
Wis. 2d 157, 242 N.W.2d 910 (1976). See generally Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative
Negligence, 1941 Wis. L. REv. 289.
81. 49 OKLa. B.A.J. at 61.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 61.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 62.
[Vol. 13:266
13
Howard: Multiple Party Litigation under Comparative Negligence in Oklahom
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
defendant will be liable only for the percentage of the
award attributable to him. 6
In an effort to complete the comparative negligence system and
achieve the objective of equitable damage apportionment, the court chose
options which required drastic modification of traditional common law
doctrines. 87 Both options identified by the court concerned the apportion-
ment of damages among the defendants, but the results of selecting one
were not the same as the other. In opting for the second solution and
abolishing the joint and several liability principle, the court chose to
apportion damages through liability limitation. Each tortfeasor in the
multiple party suit is now liable only in proportion to his comparative
negligence. Consequently, the plaintiff must now attempt to execute a
judgment against each defendant and, perhaps more importantly, bear the
risk of insolvent or unavailable wrongdoers.
1. The Judicial Basis
The underlying basis of the method for equitable damage apportion-
ment chosen by the Oklahoma Supreme Court must be carefully con-
sidered. The court employed a highly novel approach to reach the result
of abrogating joint and several liability. Finding "no pattern related to
the consequences of the elimination of the bar of contributory negligence
upon the question of joint versus several liability of co-defendants," 88 the
court relied on its perception of the common law basis for the joint and
several liability principle and the recent California decision in American
Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court.89
As explained by the Oklahoma court, the joint and several liability
principle was used to balance the inequity of common law contributory
negligence. 9° Under the common law system, a slightly negligent plain-
tiff was completely barred from recovering damages. According to the
86. Id.
87. For the discussion of joint and several liability, see text accompanying notes 20-22
supra; and for right of contribution see text accompanying notes 23-34 supra.
88. 49 OKLA. B.A.J. at,62.
89. 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 135 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1977).
90. The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:
Under the common law system of contributory negligence, a plaintiff who was
guilty of even slight negligence, could recover nothing. The law balanced this
possible inequity by allowing a plaintiff who was found to be legally "pure"
because he was not even slightly negligent, to collect his entire judgment from
any defendant who was guilty of "even slight negligence". The adoption of
comparative negligence, even in the modified form, gives judgment to any plain-
tiff whose negligence is less than 50 percent. There is no longer a need to
compensate a "pure" plaintiff.
49 OKLA. B.A.J. at 62. This paragraph appeared without cited support.
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Supreme Court of Oklahoma, this inequity was balanced by allowing a
plaintiff free from negligence to recover the entire award from any
defendant. 91
The "balance" perceived by the court was actually a balance of
inequities achieved by distributing them among successive parties. In the
court's opinion, the hardship of the slightly negligent plaintiff, barred
from any recovery, was equalized by imposing the burden of joint and
several liability upon later defendants. Such an understanding mistakes
the function of the joint and several liability doctrine. That function was
not to evenly distribute the inequities among plaintiffs and defendants,
but to assure full compensation to the injured plaintiff. Nevertheless, the
Justices concluded that the adoption of comparative negligence, permit-
ting a plaintiff less than 50% negligent to recover, tipped the balance in
favor of the plaintiff and removed the necessity of joint and several
liability.
In the Laubach opinion, the court called attention to the California
Court of Appeals decision in American Motorcycle Association. The
California case judicially abolished the rule of joint and several liability
of concurrent tortfeasors. 93 The context of the California decision is
critical. Two years prior to American Motorcycle Association, the
California Supreme Court had judicially adopted the pure form of
comparative negligence. Under that system, a negligent plaintiff is al-
lowed recovery reduced by his percentage of fault, regardless of whether
his negligence exceeds that of the defendants.94 Theoretically, a 99%
negligent plaintiff could recover 1% of his damages from a defendant
found 1% negligent. Because the pure system provides the greatest
potential for compensating the negligent plaintiff, it is highly plaintiff
oriented.
The California Court of Appeals was faced with the question of
maintaining joint and several liability in this plaintiff oriented compara-
tive negligence context. After an analysis of the social costs involved in
"loss shifting" through the device of joint and several liability, the
California court ruled that in a system of pure comparative negligence
joint and several liability was not appropriate. 95 Therefore the plaintiff
must bear the risk of an insolvent defendant. This conclusion restored the
balance within a system favoring the negligent plaintiff.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 704, 135 Cal. Rptr. 497, 503 (1977).
94. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
95. 65 Cal. App.3d 694, 702-03, 135 Cal. Rptr. 497, 502 (1977).
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The Oklahoma decision to abrogate joint and several liability was
not made in the same context as the California ruling. The 49% modified
form of comparative negligence in Oklahoma already represents the
legislative limit on the ability of a negligent plaintiff to recover dam-
ages. 96 A plaintiff may only recover if his own negligence is less than that
of the defendant. Of the comparative negligence systems, the Oklahoma
form places the most stringent qualification on the negligent plaintiff and
is the least plaintiff oriented. The plaintiffs in the pure and 49% modified
systems of comparative negligence are not similarly situated, and the
analysis of the California Court of Appeals is not appropriate to the
Oklahoma system.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has chosen to meet the objective of
equitable damage apportionment by abrogating the joint and several
liability principle and limiting liability in direct proportion to the respec-
tive negligence of each defendant. In the Laubach context, this result is
desirable. The stark inequity of forcing a defendant less negligent than
the plaintiff to bear the entire liability without a right to contribution is
clear. It is questionable whether this result is as desirable when the jury
finds the plaintiff free from contributory negligence. For example, if the
jury apportions the negligence between D1 and D2 to be 30% and 70%
respectively, the plaintiff would be permitted to recover 30% of his
damages from D1 and 70% from D2. If either is insolvent, the innocent
plaintiff will not be fully compensated. The result is a system potentially
more unjust for the innocent plaintiff than the common law system of
contributory negligence. The judicially adopted means of damage appor-
tionment has shifted the balance in favor of the negligent defendant.
Except for the recent California decision in American Motorcycle
Association, no other comparative negligence jurisdiction has judicially
reached the result of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 97 Joint and several
liability has been explicitly abolished by the Nevada comparative negli-
gence statute, 98 and the liability apportionment provision in the New
Hampshire statute 9 could also be interpreted as abolishing joint and
96. See notes 43 & 44 supra and accompanying text.
97. As explained by SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 16.4: "The concept of joint and
several liability of tortfeasors has been retained under comparative negligence, unless the
statute specifically abolishes it, in all states that have been called upon to decide the
question." Id. at 253.
98. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1977).
99. The pertinent portion of the New Hampshire statute provides that:
[W]here recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each such
defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as
damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of
causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 507:7-2 (Supp. 1975).
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several liability. The New Hampshire provision has been adopted in the
Vermont' 0° and Kansas 0 1 comparative negligence statutes as well. The
author of the New Hampshire statute justified the abrogation of joint and
several liability on the basis that the plaintiff could protect himself from
an incomplete recovery by not joining an insolvent defendant. 12 Other
state statutes have made it clear that joint and several liability is to be
maintained within the comparative negligence system. 103
2. Alternative Solutions
The Oklahoma Supreme Court could have avoided the inequity of
requiring a defendant less negligent than the plaintiff to bear the entire
liability, without the extreme solution of complete abrogation of joint and
several liability. The Texas comparative negligence statute 1 4 represents
a compromise solution to the same problem that faced the court in
Laubach. The Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that the Texas
statute provided answers to a variety of issues involving modified
comparative negligence' 0 5 but the court ignored the Texas solution to
damage apportionment.
According to the Texas comparative negligence statute, a plaintiff's
negligence must not exceed the total negligence of all the defendants. 1 0
6
This unit comparison is the same as the result reached judicially in
Oklahoma. Thereafter, the Texas law provides that each defendant is
jointly and severally liable for the entire judgment, except that a defend-
ant less negligent than the plaintiff is only liable in proportion to his
percentage of causal negligence. 107 Just compensation is provided for the
plaintiff by the unit comparison and maintenance of joint and several
liability. 108 At the same time, the defendant who is less negligent than the
100. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973).
101. KAN. CIV. PRO. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (Vernon Supp. 1976).
102. Nixon, The Actual "Legislative Intent" Behind New Hampshire's Comparative
Negligence Statute, 12 N.H.B.J. 17 (1969).
103. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1002(4) (1962); IDAHO CODE § 6-803(3) (Supp. 1977); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.3 (Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-27-41(1) (1977); Wyo. STAT. § 1-7.3(c) (Supp. 1975).
104 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978).
105. 49 OKLA. B.A.J. at 62 n.10.
106. Section (2)(b) of the Texas law provides: "In a case in which there is more than
one defendant, and the claimant's negligence does not exceed the total negligence of all
defendants, contribution to the damages awarded to the claimant shall be in proportion to
the percentage of negligence attributable to each defendant." TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 2212a(2)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
107. City of Gatesville v. Truelove, 546 S.W.2d 79,84 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a(2)(c) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
108. In the multiple party context, under a' system of modified comparative negligence,
the unit negligence comparison combined with the principle of joint and several liability,
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plaintiff is protected from suffering a disproportionate share of the
liability. If a defendant's negligence equals or exceeds that of the plain-
tiff and the former is required to bear the entire liability, the statute
provides a right to contribution to be determined in the main action. '9 By
restricting the joint and several liability principle and providing for the
right to contribution, the Texas legislature combined the two "alterna-
tives" posed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Laubach.110
Minnesota has also reached a compromise position in regard to the
principle of joint and several liability. As explained by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Kowalske v. Armour and Company,' joint and
several liability is only maintained when the defendants have engaged in
a joint adventure and the plaintiff is free from contributory negligence. 112
When the plaintiff is found contributorily negligent, he must execute
judgments against each responsible defendant. However, where the
plaintiff is free from contributory negligence, joint and several liability is
maintained, and the joint tortfeasor who bears a disproportionate share of
the liability may seek contribution from his co-defendants.
113
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision to completely abrogate the
joint and several liability principle represents an extreme solution in the
face of other available compromises. The first alternative identified by
the court, allowing "comparative contribution" among joint tortfeasors,
would have been a less drastic modification of common law doctrine.
However, judicial extention of contribution to negligent tortfeasors was
dismissed by the court as productive of unnecessary litigation and as an
infringement upon the legislature's power to grant contribution.
114
Though many states have provided for the right of contribution by
statute,115 both Maine 16 and Nebraska 17 have recently followed Wiscon-
provide the plaintiff with the greatest potential for compensation. See notes 68-81 supra
and accompanying text.
109. Section (g) of the Texas statute provides: "All claims for contribution between
named defendants in the primary suit shall be determined in the primary suit, except that a
named defendant may proceed against a person not a party to the primary suit who has not
effected a settlement with the claimant." TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a(2)(g)
(Vernon Supp. 1978).
110. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
111. 300 Minn. 301, 220 N.W.2d 268 (1974).
112. Id. at -, 220 N.W.2d at 272.
113. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1) (West Supp. 1978).
114. 49 OKLA. B.A.J. at 62-63.
115. For an extensive compilation of the jurisdictions which provide for contribution
by statute, see Note, Adjusting Losses Among Joint Tortfeasors in Vehicular Collision
Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 964, 981-84 (1959).
116. Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me. 1971).
117. Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975).
After considering the historical basis for the denial of a right of contribution among
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sin's lead 1 ' and judicially extended the right of contribution to negligent
tortfeasors.
Arkansas legislatively provided for the right of contribution in
1941119 by adopting the 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act.120 This act provided the general right to contribution on a pro rata
basis, and the optional subsection selected by Arkansas stipulated that
contribution was to be based on relative degrees of fault in situations
where a pro rata division would be inequitable. 2' The Arkansas courts
have consistently maintained joint and several liability, and since the
adoption of comparative negligence have based the right of contribution
on the jury's apportionment of negligence. 122
In 1918, Wisconsin judicially established the right of contribution
among joint tortfeasors on a pro rata basis.123 The landmark decision in
Bielske v. Schulze124 changed this system of damage apportionment.
There, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the doctrine of comparative
negligence to be based on "natural justice,' 1 25 and concluded that
contribution among tortfeasors should be determined in accordance with
the percentage of causal negligence assigned by the jury. 126 The Wiscon-
sin court took pains to clarify that the plaintiff's right to complete
recovery from the combined defendants or any individual defendant was
unaltered. 27 In judicially establishing "comparative contribution," the
negligent tortfeasors, the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized that the rule was judicially
created and that modification of the rule would not be an invasion of the legislative realm.
Id. at-, 229 N.W.2d at 189.
118. See notes 123-126 infra and accompanying text.
119. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, §§ 1-9, 1941 Ark. Acts 788
(codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to 34-1009 (1962)).
120. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 233 (1957).
121. In jurisdictions allowing contribution, it was generally based on a pro rata divi-
sion. The optional subsection of the 1939 Act attempted to change this method and to
distribute the liability according to relative degrees of fault. See PROSSER, supra note 10,
at 310; SCHWARTZ supra note 4, § 16.7, at 261.
In contrast, the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act specifies that
each tortfeasor is liable for his pro rata share of the entire liability. Relative degrees of
fault are not to be considered. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 127 (Supp. 1967). Thus a defendant
determined to be 5% negligent and forced to satisfy the entire judgment would only be
entitled to recover 50% of his payment from a co-defendant found 90% negligent. Only
Massachusetts and North Dakota have adopted the 1955 Act, and though more simplistic
in its operation than the 1939 version, such a mathematical division of liability is not in
accordance with a comparative system of fault and liability apportionment. See note 115
supra and accompanying text.
122. Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962); Little v. Miles, 213 Ark. 725,
212 S.W.2d 935 (1948).
123. Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).
124. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
125. Id. at-, 114 N.W.2d at 108.
126. Id. at-, 114 N.W.2d at 110.
127. "We make it plain at the outset, this refinement of the rule of contribution does
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traditional leader among modified comparative negligence jurisdictions
recognized the need for damage apportionment and joint and several
liability.
In considering legislative action as the apparently exclusive means
of extending the right of contribution to negligent tortfeasors, 128 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to recognize the origins of this doctrine.
The common law denial of contribution has expanded far beyond its
original context. 129 The original objectives of deterring wrongful conduct
and not aiding one who has helped cause damage to himself are no longer
pressing considerations in today's context of damage and liability appor-
tionment. Acts of the negligent tortfeasor are no longer characterized as
evil or immoral, but are considered merely careless or inadvertant. 130
Through the enactment of comparative negligence, the Oklahoma Legis-
lature has determined that a plaintiff may recover damages though guilty
of a negligent act. Judicially permitting the negligent defendant, who has
provided compensation beyond his degree of liability, to recover from his
co-defendants would have been in keeping with the modem conception
of liability and damage apportionment.
By judicially extending the right of contribution to negligent tort-
feasors on the basis of the jury's apportionment of negligence, the
Oklahoma court could have provided equitable damage apportionment 31
and completed the comparative negligence system. This solution would
not have affected the plaintiff's ability to achieve just compensation,
since the risk of insolvency would still have rested among the defendants.
In a system of 49% modified comparative negligence, providing the right
of contribution as the means for equitable damage apportionment would
have maintained the necessary balance in the multiple defendant suit.
IV. CONCLUSION
Laubach v. Morgan presented the Oklahoma Supreme Court with
its first opportunity to clarify the Oklahoma comparative negligence
statute in actions involving multiple parties. The court was called upon to
identify the appropriate means for comparing negligence where multiple
not apply to or change the plaintiff's right to recover against any defendant tortfeasor the
total amount of his damage to which he is entitled." Id. at -, 114 N.W. 2d at 107.
128. "The adoption of the theory of comparative fault satisfies the need to apportion
liability without invading the Legislature's power to grant contribution." 49 OKLA. B.A.J.
at 62-63.
129. See notes 24-34 supra and accompanying text.
130. See generally PROSSER supra note 10, § 50.
131. See notes 116-118 supra and accompanying text.
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defendants are involved and to prescribe a means of damage apportion-
ment to complete the comparative negligence system.
In the first instance, the court affirmed the unit comparison as the
correct application of the statute. This decision furthers the comparative
negligence objective of just compensation for the plaintiff by allowing
the plaintiff's negligence to be compared to the combined negligence of
the defendants. However, the plaintiff's ability to attain just compensa-
tion was diminished by the court's second determination.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court chose to abolish the principle of joint
and several liability to complete the comparative negligence system and
provide for equitable damage apportionment. Thus each defendant is
severally liable in accordance with his percentage of negligence,
whenever the jury is capable of apportioning the liability. As a result, the
plaintiff must attempt to execute judgment against each responsible
defendant and bear the risk of insolvency. In reaching this decision, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court chose not to adopt the compromise positions
of other jurisdictions by simply limiting the joint and several liability
principle. The court also considered judicial extension of the right of
contribution to negligent tortfeasors as inappropriate. Either alternative
dismissed by the court would have provided the necessary means of
damage apportionment, without the detrimental impact on the plaintiff.
Jeffrey C. Howard
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